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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COERCED CONFESSIONS
LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT AS A TEST

-

Private citizens found a 21 year old Negro loitering in an alley in a
white neighborhood of a small southern town. In an effort to solve a
series of burglaries, some involving rape, the local police took the defendant to a state prison in a neighboring county for interrogation.'
There he was held without arraignment for ten days until a satisfactory
confession was obtained.2 No close friends or counsel were permitted to
see defendant until his father gained admittance on the eighth day. Defendant was represented by counsel from the tune of arraignment. The
trial resulted in a conviction for first degree burglary with intent to
ravish, and the accused was sentenced to death. The Alabama Supreme
Court rejected petitioner's plea that the methods used to obtain his confessions violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution 8a
The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, in the case of Fikes
v.Alabama,4 reversed petitioner's conviction on the ground that the state
had violated due process of law. The majority disregarded the fact that
the police had advised petitioner of his rights, because a person of his
mentality could not be expected to appreciate the significance of such
advice. 5 Although illegal delay in arraignment was common in Alabama
and confessions obtained during the period of such detention were admissible in evidence, the Court insisted that delay was a telling circumstance in determining the voluntariness of the confession. The interrogations were not continuous, nor were they at odd hours, but prolonged
delay in the taking before a magistrate plus petitioner's low mentality
convinced the Court that the confession was involuntary and that itsuse
'The reason given by the officers for transporting the petitioner outside the county
was a threat of mob violence, although the record fails to justify this belief.
'A confession given during the fifth day proved unsatisfactory to the police because
it consisted of short answers to leading questions. The second confession was obtained on the tenth day.
Fikes v. State, 263 Ala. 89, 81 So. 2d 303 (1955)
Other grounds considered
and dismissed by the state court in a per curam opinion were that Negroes had
been systematically excluded from the grand jury, and that the trial judge had refused
to let petitioner take the stand solely for the purpose of testifying to the involuntariness of the confessions.
'352 U.S. 191 (1957)
'Petitioner is said to be "thick-headed." He started school at the age of eight and
left at age sixteen while in the third grade.
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at the trial violated due process of law.6 The Court reiterated the test
it had adopted in Sten v. New York 7 by weighing the circumstances of
pressure against petitioner's power of resistance.
Physical brutality in obtaining confessions has long been condemned
by the Umted States Supreme Court s and really presents no litigable
.issue.9 The controversies of the past seventeen years have revolved about
the elements of the more subtle mental coercion. The police practice of
grilling a suspect intensively into the late hours, usually by relay teams
of officers, has been given the label of "continuous interrogation" and
has uniformly been held to constitute mental coercion and grounds for
reversal of a conviction.10 When continuous interrogation was not
present, the Court failed to find mental coercion, and the state conviction
was sustained. 1 The vigorous dissent in the Fikes case points out the
2
absence of the usual grounds relied on for reversal in the past.The sole basis for reversal in the Fikes case -is that the pressure of the
delay in arraignment overcame pettoner's low mentality. The Court
has enunciated a rule for federal courts which prohibits the use of a
'The Court is in doubt as to whether the police methods themselves or the use at
trial of confessions obtained by those methods constituted a denial of due process.
At 352 U.S. 191, 197, the Court says, "The use of the confessions secured in this
setting was a denial of due process"; but at page 198, "the circumstances of pressure
applied against the power of resistance of this petitioner
deprived him of due
process of law."
7346 U.S. 156 (1953).
8
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
'Police brutality is still very much alive as a practical matter even though the practice
is definitely unconstitutional: At the recent hearings on the new civil rights bill,
Arkansas Attorney General Bruce Bennett testified that nearly every police department occasionally finds it necessary to resort to physical coercion. Civil Rights
Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 1, at 1176 (1957).
'Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68
(1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940). As an interesting aftermath of the Turner case, see The Saturday Evemng Post, March 2 1957 The defendant is still in jail while an appeal from his
fifth trial is going through the courts. In another case, Malinsks v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945), there were threats of physical violence; this was held to be sufficient ground for reversal of a conviction even though there was no continuous
interrogation.
n Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S: 443 (1953);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55
(1951); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
" Justice Harlan wrote the dissent which was joined in by Justices Reed and Burton.
The dissenters also argued that the power of review of state decisions was narrower
than a case from the lower federal courts and that this decision overstepped the
bounds of federal interference with state police power.
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confession obtained through illegal delay in arraignment's This federal
rule has had a haphazard existence, as the Court has held it inapplicable
when -the defendant is arraigned on some minor charge while being
questioned about a major crune,14 or when the delay takes place after a
confession.' 5 The federal doctrine has definitely been rejected by the
Court when considering state decisions,'6 although -the Fikes case seems
contra in applying the spirit, if not the letter, of the federal rule to a
7
state proceeding.'
In the past, the Supreme Court has made a distinction between the
illegal police methods themselves and the use of a confession which was
involuntary. With three possible exceptions,' 8 the Court has held that
the denial of due process consisted of the use of an involuntary confession.19 Illegal police methods used to obtain confessions have been
considered only as they influence the voluntariness of the confessions.
The Fikes case seems preoccupied with the police methods of illegal delay in arraignment, and the conviction seems to have been reversed in
order that police officers will be deterred from using such methods again,
rather than because the defendant lost his power to resist the pressure.
It is readily comprehensible that physical brutality will sap the will
of the accused and actually render his confession involuntary. Although
the effect of mental coercion is less obvious, it would also -be safe to say
that modern society recognizes that mental coercion can -have the same
result. But every police activity cannot be labeled as mental coercion;
to constitute such, the activity should be of such a nature that the
accused has no will to resist the suggestion of guilt. To say that mere
'McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)
'United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951)
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944)
For a complete discussion of the
federal rule, see Anno., 19 A.L.R. 2d 1331 (1951)
1
'Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)
'Only one prior case expressed such disfavor of delay in arraignment in a state conviction, and this was obviously dicta. "This Court has set aside convictions based
upon confessions extorted from ignorant persons who have been subjected to persistent and protracted questioning, or who have been threatened with mob violence,
or who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel, or who have been taken at night to lonely and isolated places for questiomng.
Any one of these grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal. All of them are to
be found in this case." Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942)
'Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), wavers between "'use" and "methods."
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) discusses police methods as violating due process, but the case is finally decided on the use of the confession. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) seems to be decided on the premise that the police methods
themselves violated due process.
" Even the famous physical brutality case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
reversed the conviction only on the ground that the use of the confession violated due
process of law.
'

